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Abstract
This study explores the implications of education preference in an innovation-driven
growth model that features an interaction between endogenous technological progress and
human capital accumulation. Parents invest in childrens education partly due to the
preference for their children to be educated. We consider a preference parameter that
measures the degree of this cultural preference for education. We nd that a society
such as China in which parents place a high value on education accumulates more hu-
man capital, which is conducive to innovation, but the larger education investment also
crowds out resources for R&D. As a result, a stronger cultural preference for education
has an inverted-U e¤ect on long-run growth. We also derive a closed-form solution for
the transitional path of the equilibrium growth rate from any initial state and nd that a
strengthening of education preference causes an initial negative e¤ect on growth. Finally,
we consider a number of extensions to the benchmark model.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that the Chinese society places a very high value on education. In Chinas Song
Dynasty, Emperor Zhenzong (968-1022) wrote his famous Urge to Study Poem in which an often
quoted verse is "in books one nds golden mansions and maidens as beautiful as jade." Also in
the Song Dynasty, a poet, Wang Zhu, wrote in his famous Child Prodigy Poem, "all pursuits
are of low value; only studying the books is high." This emphasis on education can be traced
back to Confucianism, which emphasizes the importance of education. Studying the origins
of this strong cultural preference for education in China, Kipnis (2011) notes that education
"invokes a system of prestige in which those with educational accomplishments are marked as
superior to the non-educated." Even in the case of Chinese families in the US, this cultural
preference for education still exerts inuences on parentsinvolvement in childrens education.
For example, from their survey data, Chen and Uttal (1988) nd that Chinese parents have
higher expectations on their childrens academic achievement and spend more time working
with children on their homework than American parents. Furthermore, Chen and Uttal (1988)
argue that these di¤erent behaviors can be explained by di¤erences in cultural values.1 However,
is a strong parental preference for education necessarily good for the economy? A BBC News
article2 discusses the costs of this "education fever" in China as well as South Korea, which
also shares the Confucian values, and reports that in South Korea, "the government believes
education obsessionis damaging society".
In this study, we use a growth-theoretic framework to explore the macroeconomic implica-
tions of parental preference for education. The growth-theoretic framework is an innovation-
driven growth model that features an interaction between endogenous technological progress
and human capital accumulation. Parents invest in their childrens human capital due to the
subjective utility that they derive from their childrens education. We consider a preference
parameter that measures the degree of this parental preference for education. We nd that a
society such as China in which parents place a high value on education accumulates more hu-
man capital, which is conducive to innovation, but the larger education investment also crowds
out resources for R&D investment. As a result, a stronger parental preference for education has
an inverted-U e¤ect on the steady-state equilibrium growth rate due to the presence of both
positive and negative e¤ects.
We also analytically derive the complete transitional path of the equilibrium growth rate
from any initial state when the degree of parental preference for education increases. We
nd that an increase in the degree of education preference has an initial negative e¤ect on
the equilibrium growth rate due to the crowding-out e¤ect of education investment on R&D
investment. However, as the level of human capital increases, the equilibrium growth rate also
increases due to the positive e¤ect of human capital on innovation. When we compare between
two steady states, we nd that the new steady-state equilibrium growth rate may be higher or
lower than the initial steady-state equilibrium growth rate, depending on the relative magnitude
of the negative crowding-out e¤ect of education investment and the positive e¤ect of human
capital on innovation and growth.
Furthermore, we consider a number of extensions to the benchmark model by allowing for a
1See also Huang and Gove (2012) for a discussion of Confucianisms inuence on the Chinese culture and
educational practice of Chinese families in the United States.
2"Asias Parents Su¤ering Education Fever". BBC News, 22 October 2013.
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pecuniary transfer from parents to children and public investment in education. We nd that
our result of an inverted-U e¤ect of education preference on growth is robust to these extensions.
Therefore, in all versions of the model, a strong parental preference for education indeed has a
certain "damaging" e¤ect on the society by exerting a negative e¤ect (in addition to the usual
positive e¤ect) on the growth rate of the economy. The underlying assumption behind this
negative e¤ect is that parents investing more of their time in their childrens education carries
an opportunity cost that crowds out other productive activities. For example, a recent SCMP
News article3 describes a growing trend of educated parents in China quitting their careers to
educate their children.
This study contributes to the literature on R&D-driven innovation and economic growth.4
Early studies in this literature do not consider human capital accumulation. More recent
studies, such as Eicher (1996), Zeng (1997, 2003), Strulik (2005, 2007), Strulik et al. (2013),
Chu et al. (2013), Hashimoto and Tabata (2016) and Prettner and Strulik (2016), explore
human capital accumulation and its interaction with endogenous technological progress in the
R&D-based growth model. However, these studies either do not explore the e¤ects of parental
preference for education or they nd an unambiguously positive e¤ect of education preference
on growth. Taking into account the negative crowding-out e¤ect of education, we nd that a
stronger parental preference for education has a negative e¤ect on the transitional growth rate
and an inverted-U e¤ect on the long-run growth rate.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model.
Section 3 explores the implications of parental preference for education. Section 4 considers a
number of extensions. The nal section concludes.
2 The benchmark model
We consider a discrete-time version of the seminal R&D-based growth model in Romer (1990).
We extend the Romer model by considering a simple structure of overlapping generations and
human capital accumulation. Each individual is endowed with one unit of time to be allocated
between leisure, work and the education of her child.5 We follow previous studies6 to assume
that individuals derive utility from their childrens education. Furthermore, they supply labor
that is embodied with human capital to earn a wage income. For simplicity, we follow previous
studies to assume that individuals only consume goods when they are old. In this case, they
3"Home Freer: Chinese Mothers Quit Jobs to Care for the Kids". South China Morning Post, 9 November
2015.
4See Romer (1990), Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)
for seminal studies in this literature.
5In this study, we do not consider endogenous fertility; see for example Chu et al. (2013), Strulik et al. (2013),
Prettner and Strulik (2016) and Hashimoto and Tabata (2016) for an analysis of human capital accumulation
and endogenous fertility in the R&D-based growth model. In the case of China, the number of children was
not freely chosen by most parents due to the one-child policy, which has been recently changed to a two-child
policy.
6See for example Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Futagami and Yanagihara (2008). In this literature on
parental investment in human capital and economic growth, studies focus on human capital accumulation as the
sole engine of economic growth. The present study complements these studies by exploring parental investment
in human capital as well as its interaction with endogenous technological progress.
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save all of their wage income when they are young and consume their asset income when they
are old.
2.1 Individuals
In each generation, there is a unit continuum of individuals. An individual who works at time
t has the following utility function indexed by a superscript t:
U t = u(lt; Ct+1; Ht+1) =  ln lt + lnCt+1 +  lnHt+1. (1)
lt denotes the individuals leisure at time t, and the parameter   0 captures leisure preference.7
Ct+1 denotes the individuals consumption at time t+1. Ht+1 denotes the level of human capital
possessed by the individuals child. The parameter  > 0 measures the degree of parental
preference for education (i.e.,  is the utility weight that an individual places on her childs
human capital). The amount of time et a parent invests in her childs education determines her
level of human capital according to the following equation:
Ht+1 = et + (1  )Ht, (2)
where  > 0 is an education e¢ ciency parameter and  2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate of
human capital that the parent passes onto her child.8 Following previous studies, we assume
for simplicity that education is the only form of bequest.
Individuals use their remaining time endowment 1   lt   et combined with their human
capital Ht to earn a wage income wt(1  lt  et)Ht. Given that individuals consume only when
they are old, their consumption at time t+ 1 is given by
Ct+1 = (1 + rt+1)wt(1  lt   et)Ht, (3)
where rt+1 is the real interest rate. Substituting (2) and (3) into (1), we can express an
individuals optimization problem as follows.
max
et; lt
U t =  ln lt + ln[(1 + rt+1)wt(1  lt   et)Ht] +  ln[et + (1  )Ht],
taking frt+1; wt; Htg as given. The utility-maximizing levels of lt and et are respectively
lt = 
+ (1  )Ht
(1 +  + )
, (4)
et =
   (1 + )(1  )Ht
 (1 +  + )
. (5)
Substituting (5) into (2) yields the level of human capital at time t+ 1 as
Ht+1 =

1 +  + 
[+ (1  )Ht] , (6)
7We consider endogenous leisure to allow individuals to choose between reducing their time spent on leisure
and work when they want to increase their time spent on their childrens education. Our results are robust to
the absence of endogenous leisure (i.e.,  = 0).
8Our results are robust to  ! 1 (i.e., parentshuman capital does not transfer to their children).
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which is the accumulation equation of human capital and shows that the dynamics of Ht is
stable. Therefore, given any initial H0, Ht always converges to its steady state.
In the steady state, the level of leisure is l = =(1 +  + ), which is decreasing in ,
whereas the level of education is e = =(1 +  + ), which is increasing in . The steady-
state level of human capital is H = =(1 +  + ), which is also increasing in . However,
the steady-state level of human-capital-embodied labor supply is
(1  l   e)H = 
(1 +  + )2
, (7)
which is an inverted-U function of . The negative e¤ect of  on human-capital-embodied
labor supply is due to the crowding-out e¤ect of education, which is captured by 1  l   e =
1=(1++). Intuitively, an increase in  causes parents to devote more time to their childrens
education e. As a result, they have to devote less of their time to other productive activities.
Although they also reduce leisure l, the reduction in l only partly o¤sets the increase in e,
resulting into an overall decrease in 1  l   e.
2.2 Final goods
Final goods Yt are produced by competitive rms using the following production function:
Yt = H
1 
Y;t
NtX
i=1
Xt (i), (8)
where HY;t is human-capital-embodied labor devoted to production and Xt(i) is intermediate
good i 2 [1; Nt]. The rms take as given the output price (normalized to unity) and input prices
wt and pt(i). The familiar conditional demand functions for HY;t and Xt(i) are respectively
wt = (1  )Yt=HY;t, (9)
pt(i) =  [HY;t=Xt(i)]
1  . (10)
2.3 Intermediate goods
There is a number of di¤erentiated intermediate goods i 2 [1; Nt]. We consider the following
simple production process that is commonly used in the literature. Specically, we assume that
one unit of intermediate goods is produced by one unit of nal goods. In this case, the prot
function is given by
t(i) = pt(i)Xt(i) Xt(i). (11)
The familiar unconstrained prot-maximizing price is pt(i) = 1=. Here we follow Goh and
Olivier (2002) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) to introduce patent breadth  > 1 as a policy
variable,9 such that
pt(i) = minf; 1=g. (12)
9The presence of monopolistic prots attracts potential imitation; therefore, stronger patent protection allows
monopolistic producers to charge a higher markup without losing their markets to potential imitators. This
formulation of patent breadth captures Gilbert and Shapiros (1990) seminal insight on "breadth as the ability
of the patentee to raise price".
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We focus on the more realistic case in which  < 1=.10 Substituting pt(i) =  into (10) shows
that Xt(i) = Xt for all i 2 [1; Nt]. In this case, (11) becomes
t = (  1)Xt = (  1)



1=(1 )
HY;t, (13)
where the second equality follows from (10).
2.4 R&D
Denote vt as the value of an intermediate good invented at time t. The value of vt is equal to
the present value of future prots given by11
vt =
1X
s=t+1
"
s=
sY
=t+1
(1 + r )
#
. (14)
Competitive entrepreneurs employ human-capital-embodied labor HR;t for R&D. The innova-
tion process is
Nt = NtHR;t, (15)
where Nt  Nt+1   Nt. The parameter  > 0 denotes an R&D productivity parameter, and
Nt captures intertemporal knowledge spillovers as in Romer (1990). The zero-prot condition
is given by
Ntvt = wtHR;t , Ntvt = wt. (16)
2.5 Aggregation
Substituting Xt = (=)1=(1 )HY;t into Yt = H1 Y;t NtX

t yields the aggregate production func-
tion given by
Yt =



=(1 )
NtHY;t (17)
and the amount of intermediate goods given by NtXt = Yt=. The resource constraint on
nal goods is
Ct = Yt  NtXt =

1  


Yt. (18)
The resource constraint on human-capital-embodied labor input is
(1  lt   et)Ht = HY;t +HR;t. (19)
10Given a labor share 1    of roughly two-thirds, the unconstrained markup ratio is 1= = 3, which is
unrealistically large. However, all our results are robust to the case of pt(i) = 1=.
11A new variety invented at time t will only start generating prots in the next period.
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2.6 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a sequence of allocations fXt(i); Yt; Ct; HY;t; HR;t; Ht; et; ltg and prices fpt(i); wt; rt; vtg
such that the following conditions are satised:
 individuals choose fet; ltg to maximize utility taking frt+1; wt; Htg as given;
 competitive nal goods rms choose fXt(i); HY;tg to maximize prot taking fpt(i); wtg as
given;
 monopolistic intermediate goods rms choose fpt(i); Xt(i)g to maximize prot (11) taking
(10) as given;
 competitive entrepreneurs in the R&D sector employ fHR;tg to maximize prot taking
fwt; vtg as given;
 the resource constraint on nal goods holds such that Yt = NtXt + Ct;
 the resource constraint on human-capital-embodied labor holds such that HY;t + HR;t =
(1  lt   et)Ht;
 the amount of saving equals the value of assets such that wt(1  lt   et)Ht = Nt+1vt.
3 Parental preference for education
In this section, we explore the implications of parental preference for education on economic
growth. Section 3.1 focuses on the balanced growth path. Section 3.2 considers the transitional
paths of human capital and the equilibrium growth rate.
3.1 Balanced growth path
Human-capital-embodied labor allocations fHY;t; HR;tg are stationary in the steady state. Then,
(13) implies that t is also stationary in the steady state. As a result, the steady-state version
of (14) simplies to v = =r. Substituting this condition into the R&D zero-prot condition in
(16), we have Nt=r = wt, where Nt = Yt(   1)= and wt is given by (9). Solving these
conditions yields
HY =

  1

1  


r

. (20)
The next step is to determine the steady-state equilibrium interest rate r. Wage income at
time t is wt(1   lt   et)Ht = wt(HY;t + HR;t), which is also the total amount of saving in the
economy at time t. The total value of assets in the economy at the end of time t is Nt+1vt,
which includes the new varieties created at time t. Given the overlapping-generation structure
of the economy, the amount of saving must equal the value of assets such that
wt(1  lt   et)Ht = Nt+1vt , wt(HY +HR) = (1 + HR)Nt=r, (21)
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where Nt = Yt(  1)= and wt is given by (9). Solving these conditions, we obtain
(1  )(HY +HR)
HY
=
(1 + HR)
r

  1


, (22)
which determines the equilibrium interest rate that equates the amount of saving to the value
of assets in the economy.
Solving (7), (19), (20) and (22) yields the steady-state equilibrium values of fr; HY ; HRg.
r =

1  

  1


, (23)
HY =
1

, (24)
HR =

(1 +  + )2
  1

, (25)
which shows that HR is an inverted-U function of . From (15) and (25), the steady-state
equilibrium growth rate of technology (and also output) is given by
g  Nt
Nt
= HR =

(1 +  + )2
  1  0, (26)
which is also an inverted-U function of . Specically, the growth-maximizing value of  is given
by (1 + )= > 0. Intuitively, a higher depreciation rate  of human capital leads to a higher
steady-state level of education e that mitigates the negative e¤ect on human capital H, and
hence, a weaker education preference  is needed to reach the level of education that maximizes
the level of human-capital-embodied labor (1   l   e)H. In contrast, a stronger preference
 for leisure reduces e and requires a stronger education preference  to reach the level of
education that maximizes (1   l   e)H. To ensure that there exists an intermediate range
of  in which the steady-state equilibrium growth rate g is positive, we impose the following
parameter restriction:  > 4(1 + ). Under this parameter restriction, there still exists a
lower bound value  of  below which g = 0, and there also exists an upper bound value  of
 above which g = 0. In other words, if  =  or  = , then HR = 0. Solving the quadratic
function  = (1 +  + )2, we derive the values of f; g given by
f; g =   2 (1 + )  
p
[  4 (1 + ) ] 
22
. (27)
We summarize these results in Proposition 1 and plot g as a function of  in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Steady-state e¤ect of education preference on growth
Proposition 1 An increase in the degree of parental preference for education has an inverted-
U e¤ect on the steady-state equilibrium growth rate. Under a su¢ ciently low or high degree of
parental preference for education, the economy is trapped in a zero-growth equilibrium.
The intuition of the above results can be explained as follows. An increase in the degree of
parental preference for education increases education investment and human capital accumula-
tion. However, it also crowds out productive resources for R&D. Specically, if  > (1 + )=,
then any further increase in  would lead to a decrease in human-capital-embodied labor supply,
which in turn reduces the amount of resources available for innovation. In this case, a stronger
degree of parental preference for education is detrimental to economic growth. Furthermore,
in the R&D-based growth model, the market size needs to be su¢ ciently large in order for
R&D investment to be protable. Therefore, when the degree of parental preference takes on a
su¢ ciently high or low value, the market size measured by (1  l  e)H becomes so small that
there is no incentive for entrepreneurs to invest in R&D. In this case, the economy is trapped
in a stagnant equilibrium with zero economic growth.
3.2 Transition dynamics
In this subsection, we derive the transitional dynamics of the economy. Substituting (17) into
(9) yields the following expression for the equilibrium wage rate:
wt = (1  )



=(1 )
Nt. (28)
Substituting (28) into (16) yields the following expression for the value of an invention:
vt =
1  




=(1 )
, (29)
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which is stationary both on and o¤ the balanced growth path. Substituting (28) and (29) into
(21) yields
wt(1  lt   et)Ht = Nt+1vt , Nt+1 = Nt(1  lt   et)Ht. (30)
Substituting (4) and (5) into (30) yields the growth rate of technology given by
gt  Nt+1
Nt
  1 = 
(1 +  + )

Ht + (1  )(Ht)2
  1, (31)
which is decreasing in  for a given Ht due to the crowding-out e¤ect of education investment
but is increasing in Ht due to the positive e¤ect of human capital on innovation. Equation (31)
shows that the dynamics of gt is completely determined by the dynamics of Ht given by (6).
We next determine the transitional path of output. Substituting (15) and (19) into (30)
yields
Nt+1
Nt
= (1  lt   et)Ht , 1 + HR;t = (HY;t +HR;t), (32)
which shows that HY;t = 1= even when the economy is o¤ the balanced growth path. As a
result, the level of output in (17) simplies to
Yt =
1




=(1 )
Nt, (33)
which shows that Yt+1=Yt = Nt+1=Nt at any point in time.
We are now ready to examine the transitional e¤ects of a change in parental preference for
education when the degree of education preference  changes from an initial value 0 to a new
value 1. Suppose at time t = 0 the economy is at an initial steady state with  = 0. In this
case, the initial value of human capital is H0 = 0=(1 +  + 0), and the initial steady-state
equilibrium growth rate is g0j=0 = 0=(1 +  + 0)2   1. From (31), we see that when 
increases at time 0 from 0 to 1 > 0, the growth rate at time 0 immediately falls to
g0j=1 =

(1 +  + 1)

H0 + (1  )(H0)2
  1 = 1 +  + 0
1 +  + 1| {z }
<1
0
(1 +  + 0)
2
  1 (34)
given that H0 is predetermined. Therefore, a stronger education preference has an initial
negative impact on growth. Then, at time t = 1, the level of human capital increases to
H1 =
1
1 +  + 1
[+ (1  )H0] = 1 +  + 0
0
1
1 +  + 1| {z }
>1
0
1 +  + 0
> H0, (35)
which determines the equilibrium growth rate at time t = 1 given by
g1 =

(1 +  + 1)

H1 + (1  )(H1)2
  1 > g0j=1 , (36)
where H1 is given by (35). After the initial decrease, the equilibrium growth rate gradually
increases until it reaches the new steady state given by g = 1=(1 +  + 1)
2   1, which
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may be higher or lower than the initial steady-state growth rate given that g is an inverted-
U function in  as demonstrated in (26) and Proposition 1. We summarize these results in
Proposition 2 and plot in Figure 2 the transitional paths of gt when  increases at time 0 from
0 to 1.
Figure 2: Transitional e¤ect of education preference on growth
Proposition 2 An increase in the degree of parental preference for education has an initial
negative e¤ect on the equilibrium growth rate and a gradual positive e¤ect on the level of human
capital. As the level of human capital increases, the equilibrium growth rate also increases. The
new steady-state equilibrium growth rate may be higher or lower than the initial steady-state
equilibrium growth rate.
Using (31) and the transitional path of human capital in (6), we can also derive a closed-
form solution for the complete transitional paths of human capital and the equilibrium growth
rate from any initial state Ht at time t when  changes from 0 to 1. From (6), the equilibrium
level of human capital at time t+ s for any s  1 is given by
Ht+s =
1
1 +  + 1

1 

(1  )1
1 +  + 1
s
+

(1  )1
1 +  + 1
s
Ht. (37)
If the economy were at an initial steady state at time t, then Ht = 0=(1 +  + 0).
As for the equilibrium growth rate at time t+ s for any s  1, it is given by
gt+s =

(1 +  + 1)

Ht+s + (1  )(Ht+s)2
  1, (38)
where Ht+s is given in (37). Equation (38) shows that for any given initial state Ht, an increase
in  at time t causes an immediate negative e¤ect on the equilibrium growth rate gt at time
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t. Therefore, suppose two economies have the same initial level of human capital Ht at time
t. The economy with a stronger cultural preference for education would have a lower initial
growth rate but possibly a higher steady-state equilibrium growth rate in the long run.
4 Extensions of the model
In this section, we explore the robustness of our results by considering a number of extensions.
In Section 4.1, we introduce public investment in education. In Section 4.2, we introduce a
pecuniary transfer from parents to children. In summary, we nd that in both cases, parental
preference for education continues to exert an inverted-U e¤ect on the steady-state equilibrium
growth rate.
4.1 Public education investment
In the benchmark model, we assume that parental involvement is the only input into education.
In this subsection, we extend the model to allow for public investment in education. For
example, the government needs to recruit teachers to educate children. In this case, we modify
the human-capital-accumulation equation in (2) as follows:
Ht+1 = S

t et + (1  )Ht, (39)
where St denotes public investment in education and is denominated in units of human capital.
Specically, we assume that St = sHt, where s 2 (0; 1) is an education policy parameter.
The parameter  2 (0; 1) determines the importance of public education in the human-capital-
accumulation process. To nance public education, the government levies a tax on the labor
income of individuals such that the budget constraint in (3) becomes
Ct+1 = (1 + rt+1)(1   t)wt(1  lt   et)Ht, (40)
where  t 2 (0; 1) is the tax rate on labor income at time t.12 The governments balanced budget
condition is
 twt(1  lt   et)Ht = wtSt ,  t = s
1  lt   et . (41)
Because of the income tax, the saving-asset equation becomes
(1   t)wt(1  lt   et)Ht = Nt+1vt , wt(1  lt   et   s)Ht = Nt+1vt. (42)
The rest of the model is the same as before.
Solving the individuals optimization problem, we nd that the equilibrium levels of leisure
and education in (4) and (5) become
lt = 
St + (1  )Ht
St (1 +  + )
, (43)
12Alternatively, one can consider a tax on interest income.
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et =
St    (1 + )(1  )Ht
St (1 +  + )
, (44)
where St = sHt. However, the steady-state levels of leisure and education are the same as in
the benchmark model. This is because the steady-state level of human capital is now given by
H =


1 +  + 
1=(1 )
s=(1 ), (45)
which is increasing in the education preference parameter  and the education policy parame-
ter s. Finally, the steady-state level of human-capital-embodied labor supply (net of public
education investment) is
(1  l   e)H   sH =

1
1 +  + 
  s


1 +  + 
1=(1 )
s=(1 ). (46)
To derive the steady-state equilibrium allocations fHY ; HRg, we also need the following
conditions. First, the resource constraint in (19) becomes
(1  lt   et)Ht = St +HY;t +HR;t ) (1  l   e)H   sH = HY +HR. (47)
Second, the R&D zero-prot condition is the same as before such that
Ntvt = wt ) HY = 
  1

1  


r

. (48)
Third, the saving-asset equation also turns out to be the same as before such that
wt(1  lt   et   s)Ht = Nt+1vt ) (1  )(HY +HR)
HY
=
(1 + HR)
r

  1


. (49)
Solving (46)-(49) yields HY = 1= and
HR =

1
1 +  + 
  s


1 +  + 
1=(1 )
s=(1 )   1

. (50)
From (50), we have the steady-state equilibrium growth rate of technology given by
g  Nt
Nt
= HR = 

1
1 +  + 
  s


1 +  + 
1=(1 )
s=(1 )   1, (51)
which is an inverted-U function in the education preference parameter  and the education
policy parameter s. Proposition 3 summarizes these results. As shown in (45), an increase in
either  or s leads to a larger stock of human capital, which has a positive e¤ect on innovation.
However, the increase in  or s also crowds out the amount of human capital available for
R&D, which causes a negative e¤ect on innovation. Combining these two e¤ects gives rise
to an overall inverted-U e¤ect on the steady-state equilibrium growth rate. Furthermore, the
growth-maximizing value of s is given by s = =(1++), which is decreasing in ; therefore,
in a society that has a strong preference for education, the government may have limited room
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to stimulate economic growth through education policy. Similarly, the growth-maximizing value
of  is given by
 =
1 + 


1  s (1 + )
1   + s (1 + )

,
which is also decreasing in s.
Proposition 3 In the presence of public investment in education, an increase in either the
degree of education preference  or the level of public education investment s has an inverted-U
e¤ect on the steady-state equilibrium growth rate.
4.2 Pecuniary transfer
In the benchmark model, we made the assumption that education is the only form of bequest
from parents to children. In this subsection, we return to the benchmark model without public
education investment (i.e., s =  = 0) but extend the model to allow for a pecuniary transfer
from parents to children. In particular, we assume that parents are altruistic and derive utility
from this pecuniary transfer. The utility function in (1) becomes
U t = u(lt; Ct+1; Ht+1) =  ln lt + lnCt+1 +  lnHt+1 +  lnTt+1, (52)
where Tt+1 denotes an income transfer from an individual to her child, and the parameter
 > 0 measures the degree of this parental altruism. Given this pecuniary transfer, the budget
constraint of an individual becomes
Ct+1 + Tt+1 = (1 + rt+1)[wt(1  lt   et)Ht + Tt], (53)
where Tt is an income transfer that the individual receives from her parent, and Tt+1 is an
income transfer from the individual to her child.
Solving the individuals optimization problem, the optimality condition for income transfer
Tt+1 is given by
Tt+1 =

1   (1 + rt+1)[wt(1  lt   et)Ht + Tt]. (54)
On the balanced growth path, we have the following balanced-growth condition:
Tt+1
Tt
=
Yt+1
Yt
=
Nt+1
Nt
= 1 + g, (55)
where g is the steady-state equilibrium growth rate of technology. It can be shown that the
steady-state equilibrium levels of leisure, education and human capital are given by
l =

1 +  +  + (g   r)=(1 + g) , (56)
e =

1 +  +  + (g   r)=(1 + g) , (57)
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H =

1 +  +  + (g   r)=(1 + g) , (58)
where r is the steady-state equilibrium interest rate. Combining (56), (57) and (58) yields the
human-capital-embodied labor supply given by
(1  l   e)H =  [1 + (g
   r)= (1 + g)]
[1 +  +  + (g   r)= (1 + g)]2 . (59)
To derive the steady-state equilibrium allocations fr; HY ; HRg, we also need the following
conditions. First, the resource constraint is the same as (19) in the benchmark model. Second,
the R&D zero-prot condition becomes the same condition as (20) in the benchmark model.
Third, in the presence of a pecuniary transfer, the saving-asset equation is modied to
wt(1  lt   et)Ht + Tt = Nt+1vt ) (1  ) (H

R +H

Y )
HY
+
Tt
Yt
=
 (1 + HR)
r

  1


, (60)
where the steady-state equilibrium transfer-output ratio is
Tt
Yt
=
(1  ) (HR +HY )
HY
(1 + r)
1 + g + (g   r) .
Solving (19)-(20) and (59)-(60) yields the steady-state equilibrium allocations fr; HY ; HRg
given by
r =
 (  1)
 (1  ) +  (  ) , (61)
HY =
1

 (1  )
 (1  ) +  (  ) , (62)
HR = (1  l   e)H  HY , (63)
where (1  l   e)H is a function of g as shown in (59).
Substituting (59) into (63), we can express the implicit function that determines g = HR
as follows:
g

=
 [1 + (g   r)= (1 + g)]
[1 +  +  + (g   r)= (1 + g)]2  H

Y , (64)
where r andHY are independent of g
 and  as shown in (61) and (62). Figure 3 plots (64).13 As
 increases, the right-hand side (RHS) of (64) initially increases and then decreases eventually.
Given that the left-hand side (LHS) of (64) is increasing in g, the steady-state equilibrium
growth rate g is an inverted-U function in education preference  as in the benchmark model.
Proposition 4 summarizes this result and also presents the growth-maximizing value of . The
proof is relegated to the appendix.
13In Figure 3, we plot the case in which the RHS is increasing. However, the RHS can also be decreasing, in
which case the comparative static result is the same.
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Proposition 4 In the presence of a pecuniary transfer from parents to children, there exists a
unique steady-state equilibrium growth rate g. An increase in the degree of education preference
 has an inverted-U e¤ect on this steady-state equilibrium growth rate, which is maximized at
arg max

g =
1 +  + 

 (1 + )
 (1 + ) + 4
 , (65)
where  is a composite parameter that is dened as   ( )(1+)
( )+(1 ) .
Figure 3: Steady-state equilibrium g
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored how parental preference for education a¤ects economic growth.
A society such as China that has a strong cultural preference for education will accumulate more
human capital, which is conducive to innovation; however, the larger investment in education
also crowds out resources for other productive activities, such as R&D. As a result, a stronger
parental preference for education carries a negative e¤ect on economic growth (in addition to the
conventional positive e¤ect), which justies policymakersconcern discussed in the introduction.
Our tractable model allows us to trace out the complete transitional e¤ects of changes in this
cultural preference, and we nd that the initial growth e¤ect from a strengthening of education
preference is always negative.
In an earlier version of this paper,14 we consider a scale-invariant extension of the model.15
In this version of the model, the long-run growth rate of technology is solely determined by
14See Chu et al. (2016).
15See Jones (1999) for a discussion of scale e¤ects in the R&D-based growth model.
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the growth rate of human capital. Therefore, a stronger education preference inevitably causes
only a positive e¤ect on the steady-state equilibrium growth rate. Nevertheless, the negative
crowding-out e¤ect still leads to a lower transitional growth rate. In other words, although
the negative crowing-out e¤ect may not a¤ect economic growth in the very long run, it always
adversely a¤ects the growth rate of an economy before it reaches the steady-state equilibrium.
Compliance with Ethical Standards: The authors declare that they have no conict of interest.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4. Using HY = (1  r)=(1 + ) from (61) and (62), we can rewrite
(64) as p
 (1 + ) (1 + g) =
(1 +  +  + ) (1 + g)  p

, (A1)
where   ( )(1+)
( )+(1 ) . The LHS of (A1) is increasing and concave in 1 + g
 from the origin,
whereas the RHS is increasing and linear in 1 + g with a negative y-intercept. Therefore,
(A1) uniquely determines 1 + g, which in turn determines g. To see the e¤ect of  on g, we
di¤erentiate the RHS of (A1) with respect to  and nd that it is increasing in  if and only if
(1 + g)  > [(1 +  +  + ) (1 + g)  ]| {z } =(2)
=
p
(1+)(1+g) by (A1)
() (1 + g)  >  (1 + ) =(42). (A2)
It is useful to note that (A1) can be reexpressed asp
 (1 + ) ~ = [(1 +  + )= + ] ~   , (A3)
where ~  (1 + g) is increasing in  as (A3) implies. Therefore, (A2) shows that the RHS of
(A1) is decreasing in  when  is small and then becomes increasing in  when  is large, which
in turn implies that g from (A1) is an inverted-U function in . The value of  that maximizes
g is  given in (65), which can be obtained by substituting ~ =  (1 + ) =(42) from (A2)
into (A3).16 Finally, it can also be shown that the condition  > 4 (1 +  +    ) =(1 + )
ensures a positive g > 0 when g is evaluated at  = .
16Derivations are available upon request.
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